This paper explores the effect of airline emissions charges on airfares, airline service quality, aircraft design features, and network structure, using a detailed and realistic theoretical model of competing duopoly airlines. These impacts are derived by analyzing the effects of an increase in the effective price of fuel, which is the path by which emissions charges will alter airline choices. The results show that emission charges will raise fares, reduce flight frequency, increase load factors, and raise aircraft fuel efficiency, while having no effect on aircraft size. Given that these adjustments occur in response to the treatment of an emissions externality that is currently unaddressed, they represent efficient changes that move society closer to a social optimum.
Introduction
As concerns about global warming mount, policy makers have begun targeting emissions from aircraft as a means of reducing the production of greenhouse gases. Most notably, the European Union starting in 2012 will require airlines to hold emission permits in order to operate. Each airline must hold a number of permits commensurate with the CO 2 pollution generated by its fleet, with permits acquired through a trading process following an initial, partially free distribution among the carriers.
1 This approach follows existing "cap-and-trade" schemes applied to polluters in the industrial and energy sectors both in Europe and in the US (see Forsyth, 2008 , for details and further discussion).
The planned emission trading system generates a permit price that becomes part of an airline's cost structure. With the carrier's required outlay on emissions permits varying in step with its total fuel consumption, the permit price is effectively added to the price of fuel, even though most of the permits will be freely distributed. Thus, the planned trading system can be viewed as equivalent to a carbon-tax scheme applied to aviation, which would explicitly raise the price of fuel. As a result, regardless of whether policy interventions to limit aviation emissions follow the EU's cap-and-trade approach or rely on taxation, they can all be depicted as policies * We thank Michael Levine for stimulating comments. Any errors or shortcomings in the paper, however, are our responsibility. 1 As of late 2008, the EU's intention was to freely distribute 85 percent of the total emission permits, with the remaining 15 percent auctioned. Movement to a 100 percent auction system is envisioned in later years. The permit distribution would cap emissions at 97 percent of the 2004 -2006 level (see Wall, 2008 .
that raise the fuel price paid by airlines. The effects of such policies thus operate in the same direction as the impacts of a secular fuel-price increase unrelated to government intervention, as occurred through mid-2008.
How will airlines respond to a policy-induced increase in the effective price of fuel?
What will happen to airfares? How will service quality, as reflected in flight frequencies and load factors, change? How will aircraft design (fuel efficiency, seat capacity) evolve in response to changes in the derived demands of airlines as fuel prices rise? Will the structure of airline networks change? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. The answers, which are derived from a simple theoretical model, are important since they predict the detailed response of a key, highly visible industry to a major government intervention in the fight against global warming.
The paper builds on the approach used by Brueckner and Girvin (2008) in their analysis of the impact of airport noise regulation. In the model, passengers value airline flight frequency and dislike high load factors because of discomfort and the higher chance of being denied boarding (bumped from a flight). 2 Passengers choose between two competing airlines based on these factors along with the fares they charge. Each airline incurs fuel cost, which depends on aircraft fuel efficiency, as well as the capital cost of the aircraft in its fleet. This latter cost depends on aircraft size (seating capacity) as well as fuel efficiency. With higher efficiency requiring better engine technology as well as use of lighter materials, aircraft capital cost rises.
Even though both design features (size and efficiency) are set by the manufacturer, the airline is portrayed as the ultimate decision-maker, with the manufacturer responding to its derived demand for aircraft characteristics.
3
A key issue in the analysis is the form of the function relating aircraft capital cost to size and fuel efficiency, measured as fuel consumption per seat. While cost per seat is realistically assumed to fall with aircraft size holding fuel efficiency constant, the interaction between fuel efficiency and size in determining capital cost is less obvious a priori. The analysis imposes a plausible general restriction on this interaction, which is satisfied by the specific functional form that is adopted to facilitate the analysis. Although engineering data could, in principle, shed light on the appropriateness of the adopted functional form, available data appear not to be rich enough for this undertaking.
4
The analysis in section 2 of the paper develops the model, deriving the airline profit function. The key parameter in this function is the price per unit of fuel. Section 3 analyzes the airline profit-maximization problem and carries out a comparative-static analysis. The model solution is given by a nonlinear simultaneous equation system, but despite the system's complexity, comparative-static analysis is feasible and yields determinate fuel-price impacts.
Some of the comparative-static results are natural (for example, the fare rises with the fuel price), but some findings are not predictable a priori. As a group, however, the comparative-static results provide important information by showing how airline emission charges (either in the 3 To a certain extent, airlines can also affect average aircraft characteristics through their decisions on retirement of the older, less fuel-efficient planes in their fleets, and through fleet deployment/operations decisions with respect to aircraft size. Discounting the A320 value (which is similar to that for the larger aircraft) as reflecting the earlier 1988 vintage, the numbers suggest that the chosen level of fuel-efficiency is higher for smaller aircraft. While these numbers are revealing, exploring the relationship between capital cost and aircraft size and fuel efficiency would require additional data on aircraft selling prices. Since sales usually occur below list prices at values that are not publicly revealed, acquisition of price data is problematic. But even if such data were available, the small number of different existing aircraft types would probably not yield enough data points to estimate, using regression analysis, the desired relationship (this exercise, were it possible, would involve regressing price on fuel efficiency and size).
form of a price for emission permits or carbon tax) are likely to affect airline decisions. The derived fare and service-quality impacts also yield an expected negative impact on passengers, whose utility from direct consumption falls. This loss is ameliorated, however, by environmental improvements from reduced emissions, as seen in the brief efficiency analysis presented in section 4.
The last part of the analysis, in section 5, investigates the effect of a higher fuel price on airline network structure, reflected in the choice between hub-and-spoke and fully-connected (point-to-point) networks. By concentrating passengers on fewer routes, a hub-and-spoke network allows better exploitation of the economies from larger aircraft, but its greater trip circuity has an offsetting effect on costs. The analysis investigates how this trade-off is affected by a higher fuel price, reaching a conclusion that is interestingly ambiguous. Thus, according to the model, airline emission charges need not systematically affect current network structures.
Section 6 offers some brief empirical evidence in support of the model's predictions, and section 7 presents conclusions.
The Model
Consider a travel market connecting two cities, which is served by two competing 
Expression (1) indicates that the airline's cost depends on trip length and the number of seats per aircraft, two variables found by Swan and Adler (2006) to be the main factors affecting aircraft costs. Swan and Adler (2006) The two airlines serving the market, referred to as firms 1 and 2, carry passenger volumes of 1 q and 2 q , respectively. 6 Each consumer makes one trip on either airline 1 or airline 2, so that the total number of passengers in the market is fixed and normalized to 1 ( 1
5 It should be noted that this cost formulation requires fuel consumption per flight hour to be independent of the duration of a flight. This independence is plausible given that high fuel consumption during the take-off phase of the flight is offset by low consumption during the landing phase, so that average fuel consumption per hour during these two phases may approximately equal to consumption per hour during the longer cruise phase of the flight. In this case, fuel consumption per hour may be roughly invariant to total flight duration, even though the landing and takeoff phases account for a smaller share of total flight hours on longer flights. 6 Although the analysis focuses on a duopoly market, it extends immediately to the n-firm case. With an n-firm oligopoly, the ½ term in traffic q (see below) is replaced by 1/n. This change can be demonstrated by applying the approach of Brueckner (2008) to the current model. For a noncompetitive alternative in developing this type of model, see Girvin (2008) .
While consumers could in principle choose not to travel, making the passenger volume elastic, the model assumes that travel demand is strong enough to allow the no-travel option to be ignored. The quantities 1 q and 2 q depend on the fares charged by the airlines, denoted 1 p and 2 p , and on the service qualities they provide.
One element of service quality is flight frequency, which determines the "frequency delay" experienced by a passenger (the difference between the passenger's preferred departure time and nearest flight time). When using a particular airline, a passenger's expected frequency delay is inversely proportional to the airline's flight frequency f, assuming the passenger's preferred departure times are random and uniformly distributed and that flights are equally spaced. 7 The passenger's cost of frequency delay on airline i can then be written γ/f i , where γ is a cost parameter common to all passengers. Douglas and Miller (1974) argue that another type of delay, denoted "stochastic delay," arises through excess demand, which may lead to denial of boarding on a flight that is oversold and thus an additional delay. Stochastic delay is affected by airline's load factor, which equals the percentage of its seats filled by passengers. Following Panzar (1979) , the analysis assumes that a passenger's probability of being denied a seat, and hence stochastic delay, is proportional to an airline's load factor, denoted l i for airline i. The cost of stochastic delay can then be written λl i , where λ is a common cost parameter. Gathering all these elements, the cost of flying on airline 1 is then the sum of the fare and the two delay costs, equal to
, with an analogous expression for airline 2.
An additional motivation for the appearance of the load factor in the passenger's cost expression is possible. While generating stochastic delay, a high load factor also imposes a cost on the passenger arising from aircraft crowdedness and the resulting discomfort. This interpretation of the load factor's impact will be useful in the welfare analysis presented below.
Although passengers compare the costs of flying in choosing between airlines 1 and 2, brand loyalty also affects the choice, as in Brueckner and Girvin (2008) . Brand loyalty appears as an extra additive term in the cost expression for airline 1, which is negative for passengers preferring airline 1 and positive for passengers preferring airline 2. Assuming that this brand loyalty term is uniformly distributed over the interval ] , [
, the number of passengers preferring airline 1 can be shown to equal
while the demand for airline 2 is given by the analogous expression with the 1 and 2 subscripts interchanged (see Brueckner and Girvin (2008) ). Thus an increase in flight frequency by airline 1 will increase its demand while reducing airline 2's demand, and an increase in the load factor or the fare will have the opposite effect. Note that, when all three variables are equal across the two airlines, each airline faces a demand of ½, exactly splitting the total number of passengers with its competitor.
Analysis of this model using a general form for the capital cost function ) , ( s e g is inconclusive.
To generate determinate results, the capital-cost function is assumed to take the following specific form:
where β and ε are positive parameters. The functional form in (3) satisfies all the conditions specified above. Using (3), (2) and (1), the profit of airline 1 can be written as
Note that the equality With the model specification now clear, it is useful to explain how the imposition of airline emission charges can be represented by an increase in the fuel price. As indicated in the introduction, the impact of emissions charges is viewed as increasing the effective price of fuel regardless of whether an EU-style cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax is used (a similar point is made by Forsyth, 2008) . To understand this claim, let x denote the number of permits required per unit of fuel consumed, so that the number of permits needed by an airline is given by xfsek. 8 It should be noted that the above formulation assumes that aircraft size and frequency can be smoothly adjusted to suit the size of the market. In reality, such decisions involve indivisibilities such as minimum aircraft sizes and minimum viable flight frequencies, which may constrain actual choices.
Letting the emission permit price be denoted z and the number of permits allocated to the airline be denoted m, the term ) ( m xfsek z − would then be subtracted from profit. This expression gives the outlay for the purchase of permits when the airline requires more than its allocation (when ) m xfsek > , or the revenue from the sale of permits when the airline has more than it can use (when ) m xfsek < . As can be seen by inspecting the first profit expression in (4), the fuel price r would then be replaced by zx r + , with the constant zm also subtracted from the profit expression. Similarly, with a carbon tax t per unit of fuel, the fuel price would be replaced by t r + . In either case, therefore, the impact of airline emission charges may be assessed simply by analyzing the impact of an increase in the fuel price.
A final point regarding the model setup concerns the assumption of a fixed total passenger volume ( 1
). Since the imposition of airline emission charges would be expected to reduce the total volume of air travel by increasing its cost relative to other goods, reliance on a model where this volume is fixed is not ideal. However, when the current approach is imbedded in a model with an elastic travel demand, the complexity of the resulting framework makes it amenable only to numerical analysis. Such analysis, which could adopt the elasticdemand setup of Brueckner (2008) , might be an undertaking in future research. 9 But the first priority is to explore a model capable of generating analytical results, and the present paper reflects this priority despite the limitation of a fixed passenger volume. 
The first-order conditions for airline 2 are symmetric, and the second-order condition (positive definiteness of the Hessian matrix of 1 π ) is assumed to hold.
Given the symmetry of the model, the equilibrium values of i p , i e , i f and i l , i = 1,2, will be symmetric across carriers, and each airline's equilibrium traffic will equal ½. Imposing symmetry in (5)- (8), substituting and rearranging, the following equations are obtained: 
The equilibrium, denoted ) , , , (
, is the solution to equations (9)-(12).
To start the comparative-static analysis, let equation (10) 
where Κ is a positive parameter. Applying the quadratic formula (viewing e 2 as the unknown), the solution for e is given by
Equation (14) In the latter case, the square root expression in the first part of (14) is larger than the expression prior to the ± sign, making the entire expression (which is raised to the ½ power) negative. To rule out the first multiple-solution case, Κ < ε is assumed to hold, so that the unique (real) solution is given by the last expression in (14) with a plus sign prior to the square root.
Equation (14) 
so that an increase in the fuel price leads to a lower flight frequency.
For the effect on the load factor, rearranging (10) yields 
using (16). That is, an increase in the fuel price leads to a higher load factor. Furthermore, since
so that a change in the fuel price does not affect aircraft size.
The fare in (9) depends on the fuel price both directly and indirectly via fuel efficiency and the load factor. Capturing these channels, the impact of a higher fuel price can be operates through e * in the denominator of the upper ratio term in (9)); and (iv) a negative indirect effect via a higher load factor, which leads to downward pressure on per-passenger cost (this effect operates through l * in the large ratio expression in (9)). Using (12) in (9), p * can be rewritten as
, which allows the net effect of these four impacts to be captured simply through the effect of the higher fuel price on l * . Thus, using (18), , 0 * > dr dp (20) so that the two positive effects above dominate the negative effects, leading to a higher fare in response to an increase in the fuel price. Summarizing the above results yields
Proposition 1. An increase in r, or an equivalent imposition of airline emissions charges, will
lead to a higher fare, lower flight frequency, a higher load factor, more fuel-efficient aircraft, and an unchanged aircraft size.
Given that both elements of airline service quality worsen, while the fare increases, passengers are unambiguously worse off following the imposition of emission charges. In addition, application of the envelope theorem to the profit expression in (4) shows that airline profit falls in response to the imposition of charges (to the rise in r). Environmental benefits from reduced emissions have not yet been considered, however, and this element will be added in the next section.
A final comparative-static question concerns the effect of flight distance on the various choice variables, and the answers are immediate. From (14), since e * is independent of k, fuel efficiency is unaffected by flight distance. Equations (9) 
Welfare Analysis
To carry out a welfare analysis, the damage from emissions must be considered along with the interests of passengers and airlines. The treatment of passenger interests in the welfare analysis can be greatly simplified if the costs associated with a higher load factor are attributed entirely to aircraft crowding and discomfort rather than to stochastic delay. The reason is that incorporation of the stochastic-delay element would require a more sophisticated analysis involving random travel decisions. Under this restriction, total consumer utility can be represented simply by consumption expenditure, equal to income minus travel costs, which are in turn given by the airfare plus the costs of schedule delay and crowding. Brand loyalties also affect utility, but they aggregate to a constant.
To compute social welfare W, consumer utility is added to airline profit, with emissions damage then subtracted. Given symmetry and the unit mass of passengers, welfare can then be written as
where y is passenger income and the last term represents emissions damage. Note that 2fesk represents total fuel usage by the two airlines, while μ is a parameter that gives emissions damage per unit of fuel burned (a linear relationship is assumed for simplicity). In the analysis of (21), the fare cancels since it represents a transfer between passengers and the airlines.
Using a related model without any environmental components, Brueckner and FloresFillol (2007) show that equilibrium is efficient in a situation when all potential passengers travel, as in the current analysis. Adapting this result to the present context, the implication is that if μ were equal to zero (eliminating any environmental concerns), then the equilibrium values of p, f, e, and l would maximize the welfare expression in (21). The efficiency result in Brueckner and
Flores-Fillol's model disappears, however, with the introduction of a travel/no-travel margin, which makes the total quantity of passengers dependent on airline choices rather than fixed.
Efficiency would similarly disappear in the present model if it were modified to allow an elastic travel demand, although (as explained above) this modification makes much of the analysis intractable.
While equilibrium in the current fixed-passenger-volume framework is efficient when when μ = 0, the equilibrium is inefficient when μ > 0. Emissions damage then arises, which airlines ignore in their decisions, and achievement of efficiency requires charging for this damage. Given the linearity of the damage function, this charge should be set equal to μ per unit of fuel. Thus, μ is the proper value for the carbon tax t. In addition, it is easily shown that the endogenous emissions-permit cost per unit of fuel emerging from the trading process (zx from above) will also equal the damage parameter μ, provided that the total number of permits distributed to the airlines is equal to the socially optimal emissions volume from (21).
The current situation, where airline emissions charges are absent, thus involves an inefficient equilibrium. Since the effective fuel price is too low, the preceding analysis indicates the directions of the divergence from efficiency. In particular, aircraft fuel efficiency is currently too low, flight frequency is too high, and the load factor is too low, although aircraft size is efficient. Emissions charges, by increasing the effective fuel price, would correct these inefficiencies by raising aircraft fuel efficiency, reducing flight frequency, and raising the load factor.
The Effect of Emission Charges on Airline Networks
This section investigates the effect of a higher fuel price on airline network structure, reflected in the choice between hub-and-spoke (HS) and fully-connected (FC) networks.
Industry observers, policy makers and researchers have all speculated about the likely network impacts of emissions charges, making such an inquiry useful. 11 Although the analysis cannot explicitly identify the optimal network configuration, the discussion investigates how emissions charges (an increase in r) affect the relative profitability of HS and FC networks, which reveals the direction of the incentive to switch configurations as r rises.
More specifically, the analysis is conducted using a three-node symmetric city layout, with all the links equidistant and the three city-pair markets assumed to have the same demand.
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The three-city system is serviced by the two competing airlines, which both use an FC network to serve the cities or both use an HS network (asymmetric network choices are ruled out). Under the FC network, passengers in the three city-pair markets are carried by direct (nonstop) flights on three routes. For a HS network, with one city serving as the hub, there are just two "spoke" routes, which connect the two non-hub cities to the hub. While spoke passengers continue to take direct flights, passengers traveling between the two non-hub cities must take two flights and connect at the hub. As a result, on a given spoke route, both local traffic and connecting traffic is carried. While this higher traffic volume allows airlines to capture economies of aircraft size, thereby reducing costs, connecting passengers fly a longer distance than under the FC network, which tends to raise costs. 13 For simplicity and without loss of generality, connecting passengers are assumed to pay the same fare as nonstop passengers.
14 Given this setup, FC profit is just three times the single-route profit expression from (4).
The FC equilibrium, denoted ) , , , (
, is then still the solution to equations (6)-(9).
In particular, FC e is determined by equation (14), and FC f is then determined by (11), FC l by (12), FC p by (9), and
In the HS case, however, revenue is pq 3 , but costs are two times (1), or 
That is, the HS profit equals three times a modified form of profit expression (4), where the ratio term involving 1 l is multiplied by 4/3 and the last term is multiplied by 2/3.
In the HS case, airline 1 maximizes profit (22) with respect to 1 p , 1 e , 1 f and 1 l , with aircraft size 1 s again the residual variable. Imposing symmetry in the resulting first-order 13 The ability to exploit the economies from larger aircraft when passenger volumes increase is an important force behind economies of traffic density. But, by allowing an increase in service quality, concentration of traffic in an HS network also affects demands in individual markets served by the network. Specifically, higher traffic allows an airline to increase flight frequency, and the improved convenience raises demand. On the other hand, higher traffic may allow the airline to raise its load factor, lowering per-passenger costs while at the same time reducing service quality, which tends to reverse the frequency-related demand increase. All of these forces are accounted for in the ensuing analysis. It should be noted that, while Oum, et al. (1995) explore the effects of these network complementarities on airlines' competitive strategies in network choice, the present paper abstracts from network rivalry considerations. By assuming that the two airlines either both use a FC network or both use a HS network, the focus is instead on the effect of emissions charges on network choice at the industry level. 14 Without this restriction, the airlines will choose different fares for connecting and non-stop passengers. However, the equilibrium solutions for the remaining choice variables are nevertheless the same as when fares are constrained to be equal. Therefore, for expositional simplicity, the equal-fare assumption is imposed.
Κ rising by a factor of 2 going from the HS to FC networks, it is easily seen that the e solution rises by less than a factor of 2 , so that 2 / < 
Using (11), (25) and (29), it then follows that . 
Thus HS FC f f < , so that flight frequency is higher under the HS network than under the FC network, a result also derived by Brueckner (2004) in a related monopoly model without fuelefficiency and load-factor choices. Furthermore, from (9) and (24), β ε 2 / ) ( 2 As indicated above, the main purpose of this section is to investigate how a higher fuel price affects airline network structure, which is done by examining the impact of an increase in r on the HS-FC profit differential.
17 Applying the envelope theorem to (4) and (22) 
An increase in r will favor a HS (FC) network, raising (lowering) the HS-FC profit differential,
when (32) 
17 Although the impact of a higher fuel price on the HS-FC profit differential is the focus of the present analysis, a straightforward extension shows that the same results apply to the HS-FC welfare differential. 18 Even if the two load factors were the same, the sign of (32) would be ambiguous. For instance, using HS FC e e 2 < from (29), the sign of (32) But since the last expression is positive, the inequality does not give the sign of the first expression and hence (32).
Both the first and last ratio terms on the right-hand side of (33) are greater than 1, but the second term is less than 1. As a consequence, the relation between 2 HS F and 2 FC F is unclear a priori.
However, substituting (14) and (28) into (33) 
where
. Setting the RHS of (34) Rearranging the inequality in Proposition 3 shows that imposition of airline emission charges will favor the HS (FC) network if the cost ratio ε/β is small (large) relative to the demand ratio γ/λ. Note that the inverse of the cost ratio is a measure of the economies of aircraft size holding e fixed, being equal to the fixed cost β/e divided by the marginal seat cost, ε/e. Thus, when size economies, as measured by β/ε, are sufficiently strong (when ε/β is sufficiently small), an increase in the fuel price favors the HS network. By contrast, the demand ratio γ/λ is the ratio of the cost of frequency delay and the cost associated with a higher load factor. When this ratio is sufficiently large, an increase in the fuel price favors the FC network.
Empirical Evidence
Although a full empirical test of the model's predictions is beyond the scope of the paper, 19 The data used in generating the four series are not available for the pre-1993 years.
It should be noted that imposition of emissions charges would lead to a less dramatic increase in the effective price of fuel than the secular increase portrayed in Figure 2 . A sense of the relevant magnitude can be gained using data and calculations presented by Scheelhasse and Grimme (2007) . Consider their numbers for the low-cost carrier Ryanair, all of whose operations are within the EU, making for an easy appraisal of the impact of EU-level charges.
Assuming that the price of a pollution permit (allowing the emission of one ton of CO 2 ) equals 30€, Scheelhasse and Grimme's computations show that the value of Ryanair's required permits would equal 2.65€ per passenger in 2008. Ryanair's average fare is 44€, and assuming zero profit and a 25 percent fuel share in costs (using the end-of-period value from Figure 2 ), the implied fuel cost is 11€ per passenger. Since the permit cost per passenger is 24 percent of this cost, emission charges can then be viewed as leading to a 24 percent increase in the effective price of fuel. This increase is much smaller than the seven-fold rise over the 1993-2008 period but appreciable nevertheless.
Note that, for a higher-cost carrier, this calculation would involve a higher fare but (given such a carrier's higher labor costs relative to Ryanair's) a lower fuel share in total cost. The resulting effective fuel-price increase would then be similar in magnitude to the 24 percent value from above. Observe also that use of a fuel cost share smaller than the assumed 25 percent value would raise the percentage increase in the effective fuel price associated with emissions charges.
Such a lower fuel cost share would be appropriate if the currently low fuel price persists.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the effect of airline emissions charges on airfares, airline service quality, aircraft design features, and network structure, using a detailed and realistic theoretical model of competing duopoly airlines. These impacts are derived by analyzing the effects of an increase in the effective price of fuel, which is the path by which emissions charges will alter airline choices. The results show that emission charges will raise fares, reduce flight frequency, increase load factors, and raise aircraft fuel efficiency, while having no effect on aircraft size.
Given that these adjustments occur in response to the treatment of an emissions externality that is currently unaddressed, they represent efficient changes that move society closer to a social optimum.
Although these impacts are clear-cut, the effect of emission charges on the optimal structure of airline networks is ambiguous. Under some parameter values, emission charges may generate a shift away from current hub-and-spoke networks toward fully-connected, point-topoint networks. But the profitability of HS networks could be reinforced by emission charges under other parameter values.
The analysis has several limitations that could be addressed in future work. Most importantly, the model assumes that the total volume of airline passengers is fixed and thus unaffected by fuel prices and hence emission charges. More-realistic models that use the main elements of the present approach but incorporate an elastic demand for travel could be analyzed, but the resulting increase in complexity would necessitate use of numerical methods. The analysis is also based on a special, though realistic, form for the key function relating aircraft capital cost to seat capacity and fuel efficiency. Since some of the results (for example, the invariance of aircraft size to fuel prices) may depend on use of this functional form, the effect of adopting other specifications should be explored, perhaps numerically.
Airline emission charges are an important potential policy tool in the growing movement to address global warming, and they affect a highly visible industry that serves an important, affluent clientele. As a result, analysis of the impact of emission charges on airline decisions is a 
